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I.

INTRODUCTION

Many individuals perceive the European Communities as an international organization having little impact on their daily lives.
The lack of practical realizations, such as the long awaited European passport, has reinforced this perception in the minds of citizens, even the citizens of Member States. On a legal plane, however, the fundamental rights of individuals have been more and
more affected by the pervasive influence and action of the European Community (EC) and its nature as a "new international legal order." Because the EC's legal norms have direct internal implications, unlike international organizations such as the United
Nations, the EC's influence extends beyond that of an international legal order. Individuals in the Member States are granted
new rights and obey new duties under the EC. To the extent that
all Member States adhere to the "Rule of Law," however, these
new rights and duties must be enacted within certain limits to
protect the fundamental rights of individuals against arbitrary or
capricious rules and decisions. The EC does not have a traditional
constitution, and treaties in the European Community contain
only a few provisions dealing with fundamental rights.1 This .unsatisfying situation, nonetheless, has not resulted in the infringement of rights because of the EC Administration's spirit of legality and the Court of Justice of Luxembourg's imaginative and
progressive decisions. In addition, the EC's possession of limited
prerogatives has contributed to relatively few infringements of
fundamental rights.
The institutions of the EC increasingly are concerned that the
inadequacy of fundamental rights protections may be an obstacle
to the integration of the Communities and may undermine their
international standing. The European Parliament, the Council,
and the Commission issued a joint declaration in 1977 stressing
their commitment to the protection of Human Rights "[a]s de1. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar.
25, 1957, arts. 7, 48, 52, 57, 117, 119, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as EEC
Treaty]; see also The Protection of FundamentalRights as Community Law Is
Created and Developed, 9 BULL. Eun. COMM. (Supp. 5/76), Point 7, at 8 (1976)
("the EEC treaty aim[s] to guarantee and improve the position of the individual
in the Community") [hereinafter cited as Protection of FundamentalRights].
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rived in particular from the constitutions of the Member States
and the European Convention for the protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms."'2 In 1979, the European Parliament adopted a resolution that urged the accession of the EC
to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).3 This
resolution endorsed an earlier memorandum issued by the Commission that advocated the accession of the EC to the ECHR.4 In
1976, the Commission investigated the situation of fundamental
rights in the Community legal order and presented a report to the
European Parliament and the Council which stated that the
"standard of protection of fundamental rights, as it can be taken
from the more recent decisions of the Court of Justice, is satisfactory."5 Although the Court's subsequent rulings indicated a commitment to a greater protection of fundamental rights,6 the Commission felt it necessary to reverse its 1976 position and promote
adherence to the ECHR.7
The Commission's modification of its opinion undoubtedly is
based on a reevaluation of the function of human rights protections in integrating the Communities.8 The accession to the Convention also may prove to be a means of dispelling threats to the
legal cohesion of the Communities 9 and a political and symbolic
step toward the European Union. 10
These advantages of integration should not hide the numerous
problems triggered by the accession.11 The process of accession
raises several international legal questions concerning the negotiation and ratification of the ECHR and the participation of the
2. European Parliment, Council and Commission: Joint Declaration,20 O.J.
EuR. COMM. (No. C 103) 1, 1 (1977). The Joint Declaration referred to the
Court's decision in Nold v. Commission, 1974 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 491, 507.
3. Resolution on the Accession of the Communities to the European Convention on Human Rights, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 127) 69, 70 (1979).
4. Commission Memorandum: Accession of the Communities to the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 BuLL. EuR. COMM. (Supp. 2/79) (1979)

[hereinafter cited as Accession of the Communities].
5. Protection of FundamentalRights, supra note 1, Point 39, at 16-17.
6. See Nold, 1974 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 507; see also Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 3727; Rutili v. French Minister of the Interior, 1975 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1219.
7. See supra note 4.
8. See infra pt. II and accompanying text.
9. See infra pt. H A and accompanying text.

10. See infra pt. 11 B and accompanying text.
11.

See infra pt. H and accompanying text.
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EC in the organs of Strasbourg. 12 The most difficult problems,
however, are the internal complications produced by the coexistence of two identical instruments-the ECHR as signed by each
Member State and the ECHR as signed by the EC-in the legal
orders of the Member States."3
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE COMMUNITIES

A. Human Rights as an Obstacle to the Integration of the EC
Human rights in the EC legal order, until recently, have been a
crack in the European edifice. The drafters of the EEC Treaties,
the modern founding fathers, probably thought that the economic
objectives of the Treaties made the protection of fundamental
rights unnecessary. 14 This view, however, ignores the fact that
every legal norm must be enacted within certain limits. Moreover,
the economic objectives of the Treaties make compliance with
fundamental rights even more important because fundamental
rights increasingly tend to be social and economic rights.
When EC law is directly applicable in cases before the national
courts, challenging individuals often argue that the EC rules do
not respect the basic human rights embodied in their national
constitution. The Court of Justice rejected this argument of unconstitutionality, stressing that the Court was "[N]ot in charge of
assuring the respect of the internal legal norms, even constitutional, of the Member States. 1

5

The national courts, however,

could not evade this argument.
The German and Italian constitutional courts have endangered
the supremacy of EC law in cases that have questioned the EC's
lack of fundamental protections. The German Court held that EC
law could be reviewed on the basis of the fundamental rights provisions of the Grundgesetz, thus impairing the absolute
supremacy of EC norms."6 After the memorandum of the ComSee infra pt. III B and accompanying text.
See infra pt. III A and accompanying text.
14. J. BOULOUIS & R. CHEVALIER, GRANDS ARRPrrS DE LA COUR DE JUSTICE DES
COMMUNAUT]S EUROPAENNES 101 (2d ed. 1978).
15. Id. (citing Mining Companies of the Ruhr Basin v. The High Authority
of the ECSC, 1960 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 423; Fredrich Stork & Co. v. High
Authority of the ECSC, 1959 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 17).
16. Decision of May 29, 1974, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 37
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 271.
12.
13.
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mission supporting adherence to the ECHR was issued, however,
the German Court held in a July 1979 decision that it accepted a
limitation on its review of primary EC law under the German
17

constitution.

The German Court's decision apparently did not exclude the
secondary EC law from review.' The Italian Court envisaged the
possibility of reviewing EC norms that violate the fundamental
principles of the Italian Constitution or the inalienable rights of
9
man.

1

The Court of Justice, confronted with these challenges by the
national courts, developed a body of case law in which the concern for fundamental rights led to a higher level of protection for
individuals. Because the Court's case law in this field has been
studied often, a detailed description here is unnecessary. 0 The
recent Hauer case2' best summarizes the Court's position. In
Hauer, an EC act was challenged as a violation of the German
Grundgesetz. In deciding whether the plaintiff's fundamental
rights had been infringed, the Court considered both the common
constitutional principles of the Member States and the ECHR,
which binds all Member States. The Hauer decision is tantamount to holding that the Communities are bound by the
ECHR.22
This progressive and imaginative body of case law, however, is
not an adequate answer to the national constitutional challenges.
The German Constitutional Court is reluctant to yield completely
to the absolute supremacy of EC law because the protection
reached by combining the ECHR and common constitutional
principles is a minimum standard. This resulting level of protec17. Decision of July 25, 1979, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 52 BVerfG
187. See Glaesner, Einige Uberlegungen zum Beitritt der EG zur Europiiischen
Konvention far Menschenrechte, 1980-2 EUROPARECHT 121-22.
18. Glaesner, supra note 17, at 121-22.
19. Judgment of Dec. 27, 1973, Corte Cost., Italy, 1973 Giurisprudenza Constituzionale 2406.
20. See generally Edeson & Wooldridge, European Community Law and
FundamentalHuman Rights, 1976-1 L.I.E.I. 1 (discussing the case law of the

Court of Justice and the decisions of the German and Italian Constitutional
Courts).
21. Hauer, 1979 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 3727.
22. Some authors have argued for a long time that the EC is bound by the
the decisions of the ECHR. See, e.g., Waelbroeck, La Convention Europ~enne
des Droits de l'Homme lie-t-elle les Communautks Europ~ennes?, in DROIT
COMMUNAuTAIE

ET DRorr NATIONAL

(1975).
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tion reflects, as to each fundamental right, the standard of protection provided by the least protective Member State. Because
"common constitutional principles" are common only if accepted
by all Member States, it logically follows that a principle adopted
by all but one Member State cannot serve as a guideline or "inspiration" for the Court.
The CFDT case 23 exhibits the weakness of the EC's position
regarding fundamental rights. In CFDT a French trade union,
Confederation Frangaise D~mocratique du Travail, challenged a
decision by the Council of the EC before the European Commission of Human Rights in Strasbourg on the grounds that the EC
failed to respect certain provisions of the ECHR. Although the
Commission determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the EC,it
left open the issue of whether an act accomplished by an organ of
the EC triggers the collective responsibility of the nine Member
States under the ECHR. 24 The CFDT case points out the incomplete protection of individuals' rights and the dependence of the
EC at an international level. The Commission in Strasbourg could
not enforce the responsibility of the EC, but only the collective
responsibility of its constituents. The situation represented by
the CFDT case is frustrating because it is tantamount to a denial
of the international personality of the EC.
B. The Political Advantages of the Protection of Human
Rights Within the Community Legal Order
Human rights protections, if properly used, can provide an excellent means to enhance the status of the EC and promote the
unification process of the EC legal order. The adoption of the
ECHR by the EC could serve as an indirect method of achieving
the European Union. In his report on the European Union, L.
Tindemans proposed "[tihe protection of the rights of Europeans,
where this can no longer be guaranteed solely by individual
states. '25 He added that:

The gradual increase in the powers of the European Institution
23. Confederation Franmaise D6mocratique du Travail v. The European
Communities, 1978 Y.B. EuR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 530 (Eur. Comm'n on

Human Rights).
24. Id., Point 5, at 538.
25. European Union: Report by L. Tindemans to the European Council, 9
BULL. Etm. COMM. (Supp. 1/76) 26 (1976) [hereinafter cited as European

Union].
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which will make itself felt while the Union is being built up will
make it imperative to ensure that rights and fundamental freedoms, including economic and social rights, are both recognized
and protected. 6In this the Union will find confirmation of its politi2
cal objectives.
Thus, the protection of human rights is necessary to the overall
political design for Europe. By acceding to the ECHR, the EC
would follow the pattern found in most Western states-enacting
legislation or constitutional provisions to embody fundamental
rights at the state's creation or after a major event.27
In these Western countries, however, the state preexisted the
legislative embodiment of fundamental rights. But can this historical order be reversed considering that the embodiment of the
ECHR in European law would be a decisive step toward establishing a European State? The Commission in its 1976 report concluded that the "express embodiment of fundamental rights in a
future European Constitution remains desirable, if not essential."2 The ECHR, therefore, could provide a preconstitutional
basis thereby making the move toward a supranational or federal
state in Europe less complicated.
The political and symbolic step toward a European Union is
not the sole reason for the Commission's reevaluation of its position during the years between 1976 and 1979. In 1976 the Commission adopted the view that "in the light of the present structure of the Community, the most complete protection of
fundamental rights is ensured by the Court of Justice which guarantees a maximum level of protection. '2 The Commission's
statement appears to be based on an ambiguous analysis of two
points. The first point relates to the Commission's view of the
level of fundamental rights protection in the EC:

26. Id.
27. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Magna Carta was enacted after
the rebellion of the barons and the Bill of Rights (1688) was adopted after the

bourgeois revolution. In the United States, the Bill of Rights was passed after
independence was secured from Great Britain. In France, the Declaration des
Droits de l'Homme was signed in 1789. In Germany (B.R.D.), the Grundgesetz
comprising basic rights was enacted after the tragic period of Nazism and World
War II. More recently, Canada, after Quebec's failure to achieve independence
(souve'rainetg-association),adopted a Bill of Rights during the same period that
it was repatriating the Constitution.
28. Accession of the Communities, supra note 4, Point 39, at 17.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
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In interpreting the decisions of the Court of Justice, the Commission proceeds from the basis that the substantive content of the
fundamental rights recognized under Community law must be defined in accordance with the national standard that affords the
maximum of protection whilst taking into account the general interest, in order to achieve an optimum standard of protection of
fundamental rights in the Community. 0
The Commission examined the Nold case 1 and concluded that by
recognizing the constitutional traditions common to the Member
States, the Court seemed "to have moved toward a sort of optimum standard of fundamental rights. '3 2 The Commission's evaluation is ambiguous because the Court, in fact, laid down a minimum standard by first considering the "common constitutional
traditions, ' 33 and then by considering the ECHR in the Hauer
case.34 These legal norms were the lowest common denominator
because of their common nature; Member States, however, are
not prevented from adopting a higher standard of protection. The
optimum standard of protection as embraced by the most progressive Member State, however, may not be compatible with the
legal and social order of a less advanced Member State.3

Id., Point 31, at 15 (emphasis added).
1974 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 491.
Accession of the Communities, supra note 4, Point 9(iii), at 9.
Nold, 1974 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 507.
Hauer, 1979 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 3727.
Some authors argue in favor of a maximum theory. See, e.g., 1 A. TOTH,
LEGAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 109 (1978).
Toth states:
In order that a basic right be protected at Community level, it cannot be
required that it be protected by the Constitutions of all the Member
States. On the contrary, Community law calls for the application of a
'maximum theory' which is capable of affording the maximum possible
protection. Accordingly, any basic right that is enshrined in the Constitution of any Member State must be safeguarded by the Communities.
Id. (emphasis added). Unfortunately, Mr. Toth undermines his argument because he also states:
Generally speaking, for a legal principle to be recognized as part of Community law it is not necessary to be unanimously accepted in the legal
systems of all Member States, not even in the majority of them, nor to
represent at least the "lowest common denominator" or the "lowest limit"
of the national solutions.. . . It is nevertheless clear that there is no general common principle where the national laws vary to such an extent that
it is impossible to extract from them a truly common meaning of the legal
concept. Nor where a principle in one Member State is not at least gener30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
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The Commission also overlooked the advantages to be gained
from the inclusion of a catalogue of fundamental rights in EC law.
A catalogue, such as the ECHR, would address the German Constitutional Court's criticism 6 in its 1974 decision and, therefore,
would strengthen the supremacy of EC law. Because of the difficulties arising from the accession of the EC to the ECHR 3 7 and
the amount of time that such a process would require, the
strengthening of the supremacy of EC law is a fundamental and
essential impetus to the proposition of accession.
The Commission itself recognized the importance of strengthening EC law supremacy in its memorandum:
Finally accession would reduce the risk of national courts using the
absence of a written catalogue of fundamental rights formally
binding upon the Community as justification for reviewing acts of
the Council or the Commission by reference to their national Constitution, and possibly declaring them inapplicable in the light of
those Constitutions, thus violating the principle of the uniformity
of Community law.38
Because the ECHR does not take into account social and economic rights, the German Court or the Italian Court can continue
to question the sufficiency of human rights protection in the EC
and thereby continue to endanger the supremacy of EC law.39
The coexistence of two similar legal instruments in the national
legal orders of the Member States will cause the EC supremacy
issue to be one of the most acute problems arising out of the EC's
accession to the ECHR.

ally known in the others.
Id. at 86-87 (emphasis added). This last sentence contradicts the affirmation
that any basic right enshrined in any constitution has to be accepted at the
Community level; a basic right enshrined in only one constitution could not be
accepted following the approach of Mr. Toth. This illustrates the point that the

"optimum standard" theory as expressed by the Commission is not easily ac-

ceptable even if it would be desirable. See supra text accompanying note 32.
36. Decision of May 29, 1974, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 37 BVerfG
271.
37. See supra pt. II A.
38. Accession of the Communities, supra note 4, Point 16, at 12.
39. See Glaesner, supra note 17, at 122.

896

III.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16.887

PROBLEMS TRIGGERED BY THE ACCESSION TO THE

ECHR

The accession to the ECHR triggers two kinds of problems: internal problems such as the supremacy of EC law and international problems such as the enhancement of the EC's international status through its adherence to the ECHR. The
international problems raise questions concerning the adherence
itself and participation in the organs of Strasbourg.
A. The Possible Conflicts Between the Community Convention
and the Member States Conventions
1.

The View of the Commission

The Commission takes the view in its memorandum that the
formal incorporation of the ECHR into EC law would not change
the effect of EC law within the national legal orders of the Member States. The Commission argues that:
Accession by the Community to the ECHR can have implications
only for Community law as such. Additional obligations would
arise only with regard to the freedom of action of the Community
institutions and their legislative and administrative functions. The
position of the Member States while exercising their own powers
would not be affected by accession despite the primacy of Community law over national law.40
2.

Appraisal of the Position of the Commission

The Commission optimistically attempts to reassure the Member States that accession would not alter the status of the ECHR
in municipal law. As discussed earlier,4 ' one of the primary aims
of accession is to promote the supremacy of EC law. Because the
principle of supremacy would also apply to the ECHR, conflicts
could arise between the ECHR as signed by each Member State
(national ECHR or NECHR) and the ECHR as signed by the EC
(Community ECHR or CECHR).

40. Accession of the Communities, supra note 4, Point 41, at 20 (emphasis
added).
41. See supra text accompanying notes 37 & 38.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE EC

Fall 19831

a. The domestic rank of the CECHR
The first problem of accession is the rank of the CECHR within
the hierarchy of norms of the Member States. The supremacy of
EC law is now a well-settled principle."2 Both primary (treaty
law) and secondary (derived law such as regulations or directives)
EC law supersede any conflicting national norm, even a statute
enacted by a parliament. In addition, international agreements to
which the EC is a contracting party are inserted into the EC legal
order and become EC law.43 The rank of these international

agreements in the EC legal system is inferior to that of the EEC
Treaty4" but superior to that of derived EC law. 45 The CECHR,
therefore, would be part of the EC legal order and would enter
the national legal orders.46 Consequently, two Conventions would
coexist in the legal order of a Member State.
b. Sources of conflict
This coexistence may result in conflicts between the two
ECHR. One type of conflict, described as a material conflict,
could occur if the material provisions of the two ECHR are dissimilar. Another source of conflict is the direct effect of EC law in
Member States within which the NECHR presently does not
have direct effect.
(i) Material conflicts.-Material conflicts may arise when the
provisions of the CECHR are broader or narrower than those of
the NECHR.47 As an example, assume that the CECHR is more
protective than the NECHR and that an EC directive is implemented in a Member State through a "national norm" challenged
by an individual. Depending upon the willingness of the lower
42. See Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.P.A.,
1978 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 629 (the most important recent case on this topic).
43. See 1 ENCYCLOPADIE DALLOZ DE DROIT
Europ~ennes (Droit), Points 120-21, at 404.

INTERNATIONAL,

Communautes

44. Id., Points 123-25, at 404. The international agreements must respect the
constitutional order of the EC. See Opinion 1/76, 1977 C.J. Comm. Eur. Rec.
741; see also Louis, Mise en oeuvre des obligations internationalesde la Communaut dans les ordres juridiques de la Communautg et de ses Etats Membres, 1977 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 138.
45.

1

ENCYCLOPEDIE

DALLOZ

DE

DROIT

Europtennes (Droit), Points 126-27, at 404-05.
46. See Louis, supra note 44.
47. See infra Annex 1.

INTERNATIONAL,

Comrnmunauts
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courts, a national court will eventually refer the question of
whether the directive is valid or constitutes a violation of fundamental rights to the European Court of Justice of the EC.4 8 The
Court will then apply the CECHR as the standard of review for
the directive. If the Court finds a violation of the CECHR, the
legal basis of the national norm will be void, and, consequently,
this norm also will be void. If the Court finds no violation of the
CECHR, the directive will be valid. Failure to find a violation,
however, does not prevent the national norm itself from constituting a violation of the CECHR; the national act could both conform to the NECHR and simultaneously violate the CECHR, to
the extent that the CECHR is more protective than the NECHR.
The Member State, therefore, is bound by the CECHR on two
alternative grounds when implementing an EC norm, such as a
directive.
A Member State that implements a directive may be acting as
an EC organ and not as a sovereign State. Commenting on the
implementation of directives by Member States and the nature of
their competence in this process, Professors Boulouis and Chevalier state that:
II n'en reste pas moins que cette comp6tence est, en tout 6tat de
cause, une competence like aussi bien dans son exercice que dans
sa finalit6, ce qui se concili assez 49mal avec les caractbres ordinairement r~connus a la souverainet.
Acting as a Community organ, the Member State will be bound
by the CECHR. If a Member State contends that it is not acting
as an EC organ when implementing a directive,50 it nevertheless
will be bound by the CECHR under Article 228-2 of the EEC.
This provision states that "[A]greements concluded under the[se]
conditions . . . shall be binding on the institutions of the Community and on Member States."51 Without discussing the scope
of CECHR application within the internal legal orders of the

48. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177.
49. J. BOULOUIS & R.M.

CH.VALMR, supra note

14, at 49-51. The English

translation of this quote is: "It remains that this competence is, in any case,
bound, both in its exercise and its purpose, a situation hardly compatible with

the usual attributes of sovereignty."
50. It is indeed likely that a Member State can be sued by the Commission
under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty if it does not carry out the directive.
51.

EEC Treaty, art. 228-2.
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Member States,52 it is certain that, at the very least, the CECHR
will apply to national acts implementing EC norms. If the
CECHR did not apply, Article 228-2 would have no force and the
Member States would be able to disregard the binding effect of
the international agreement. 3
Thus, the CECHR is binding upon the Member State when it
implements a directive. The national judge should review the national norm and evaluate the action of his government or parliament on the basis of the CECHR. The judge, therefore, will be
required to set aside his state's NECHR which, by not recognizing a violation of a fundamental right, stands in conflict with the
52.

See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.

53. 0. Jacot-Guillarmod considers that:
Dans l'ex~cution interne des accords internationaux conclus par la Communaut6, les Ittats Membres apparaissent . . . moins comme sujets de
Droit International Public que comme organes des Communauts. Is sont
donc vises, pour reprendre dans ce contexte particulier le langage de
l'arret Defrenne, dans l'exercice de toutes celles parmi leurs fonctions qui
peuvent concourir a l'ex~cution de cette obligation, autrement dit aussi
bien dans leurs fonctions l6gislative et executive que judiciaire.
0. JACoT-GUILLARMOD, DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE ET DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC

97 (1979) ("In the internal execution of the international agreements concluded
by the Community, the Member States appear less as subjects of public international law than they appear organs of the Community. They are thus affected,
using in this particular context the language of the Defrenne judgment, in the
exercise of all of their functions that may contribute to the execution of this
obligation, be it their legislative, executive, or judicial function.") Therefore, a
Member State, when implementing a Community norm, cannot disregard the
international agreements entered into by the EC: it would have to respect the
ECHR.
Paul Reuter, in his commentary on Article 228 of the EEC, writes that:
In its memorandum on the Accession of the Communities to the European
Convention on Human Rights... the commission stated that in its view
that action would have an effect only on Community law; it would not
affect the operation of the European Convention on Human Rights within
the internal (non-Community) law of the Member States. The language of
the Memorandum suggests that this view is based on the Commission's
assumption that international agreements entered into by the Community
do not bind the Member States internationally as to matters which are not
within Community jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Ruling 1/78 of November 14,
1978, 228.02. [b] [1] indicates that the Member States have an obligation,
within the sphere of their jurisdiction, to cooperate with the Community
in the implementation of the Community's international obligations.
6 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A
COMMENTARY, art. 228, at 6-242 (1981) (Columbia Law School Project on European Legal Institutions).
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CECHR. Rejecting the state's NECHR will ensure the supremacy
of the EC norm over the conflicting national norm. The question
that arises from such action is whether a national judge has the
power to set aside a treaty.5
As another example of a material conflict, assume that the
NECHR provides more protection than the CECHR and that a
national norm, based on an EC directive, is challenged by an individual. In this case, a national court will refer the question of the
directive's validity to the Court of Luxembourg. If the Court finds
a violation of the CECHR, the directive will be void and, consequently, the national norm also will be void. If the Court finds no
violation of the CECHR, the legal basis of the national norm will
be valid. Following the same reasoning discussed earlier, the standard of review for the national act will be the CECHR. The national act, therefore, may violate the NECHR and conform to the
CECHR which, by hypothesis, is less protective. Individuals in
this situation could be deprived of some protection on the
grounds of EC law supremacy. Although this latter conflict can be
solved, the problem presented by the first hypothetical is more
difficult and troublesome to resolve.
(ii) The direct effect of the CECHR.-Another source of conflict derives from the NECHR's current status in the legal orders
of the Member States. In most Member States, the NECHR may
be invoked by the citizens before the national courts, but, in some
others, such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark, citizens do not possess this right. Even if the NECHR and the
CECHR materially conflict, in those countries in which citizens
lack the power to invoke the NECHR, an individual could invoke
the CECHR before a court by relying on the direct effect of EC
law. Although all the international agreements of the EC do not
have direct effect and therefore can not be invoked automatically
by individuals before the national courts, the Court in the International Fruit55 case established the criteria for recognizing international agreements which create rights for individuals. In deciding whether an international agreement should be recognized, the
Court referred to the spirit, the terms, and "6conomie g6n6rale"
of the GATT.56 Although the Court did not consider the GATT
54. See infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.

55. International Fruit Co., N.V. v. Produktshap voor Groenten en Fruit,
1972 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1219.
56. Id. at 1227.
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to be directly applicable in International Fruit, the Court did
recognize in a later case the direct effect of an external agreement
of the EC, the Yaounde Convention.
Under the direct effect principle, the CECHR may be invoked
by individuals in the Member States. As a result, the CECHR,
which was created to provide protections, rights, and remedies to
individuals in the international legal order, would be applicable in
the Member State in which the NECHR is not presently invokable. A British, Irish, or Danish citizen could challenge a national
act implementing an EC norm on the ground that it infringes the
CECHR. This result is paradoxical because a citizen could invoke
the CECHR but not the NECHR, even when his country is a contracting party to the Convention. In addition, the possibility of
these challenges to national acts raises a question concerning the
scope of the CECHR's applicability in the legal orders of the
Member States.
c. Resolution of the conflict
This section examines the methods of solving the conflicts outlined above. Solving these conflicts raises other questions that
have been addressed superficially in the preceding section:
1) To what extent is it possible to restrict the application of
the CECHR in the domestic orders of the Member States to
national acts implementing EC law?
2) Acknowledging the supremacy of the CECHR to the
NECHR, should the national courts be allowed to set aside
the NECHR if a material conflict exists?
(i) Scope of applicabilityof the CECHR.-At issue is whether
the CECHR should be a standard of review for national acts implementing only EC law or for all national acts. The use of the
CECHR as a standard for reviewing national acts would cause the
NECHR to be superseded. This position does not reflect the
Commission's view that "[a]dditional obligations would arise only
with regard to the freedom of action of the Community institutions and their legislative and administrative functions." 858 This
statement appears, however, to negate the supremacy of EC law.
57. Bresciani v. Amministrazione Italiana Delle Finanze, 1976 C.J. Comm. E.
Rec. 129.
58. Accession of the Communities, supra note 4, at 26.

902

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16.887

The principle of supremacy as expressed in Costa59 and Internationale Handelsgesellschaft° directs that any EC norm supersedes any national norm, regardless of their respective rankings
within the hierarchy of norms.
The next problem which must be addressed is whether an EC
norm, such as the CECHR, should be applied when the interests
of the EC are not at stake. The application of the CECHR in the
absence of EC interests appears unnecessary because the competencies of the EC are enumerated;"1 consequently, the CECHR
would be protecting the fundamental rights pertaining to these
enumerated competencies. The CECHR's scope of applicability,
therefore, need not extend to "normal" national acts. Adopting
this view, however, threatens the principle of supremacy itself.
Limiting the CECHR's scope runs contrary to the provision of
Article 228-2 of the EEC, which does not expressly limit the extent to which a Member State is bound by international agreements entered into by the EEC. Article 228-2 also does not restrict this binding effect of international agreements to Member
State "Community activities" such as implementing EC norms.
Two views of the CECHR's scope of applicability can be defended: (1) the CECHR is relevant only when EC law is involved;
and (2) the scope of the CECHR is broader, and it would be paradoxical to grant individuals some rights under the CECHR and to
refuse those same rights under the NECHR. The Member States,
however, would be unlikely to accept the second view.
(ii) Role and power of the national judge.-Irrespective of the
CECHR's scope, the proper attitude of a national court faced
with a national act that implements a Community law which contravenes the CECHR, but not the NECHR, must be determined.
Given a situation in which fundamental rights requirements differ, the material provisions of the two conventions would be in
conflict. This conflict should be solved by applying the Simmenthal case,6 2 in which the Court held that "every national

59. Costa v. Enel, 1964 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 585.
60. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr-und Vorrats-stelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1125.
61. Although the EC has limited competencies more strictly, it does not prevent them from enjoying implied powers as shown in the ERTA case.
62. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.P.A., 1978
C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 629.

Fall 1983]

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE EC

court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law

in its entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any provision of national
law which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to
the Community rule." 63
The Simmenthal holding apparently dictates that the national
court should set aside the NECHR. The decision to reject the
NECHR, however, raises important questions: (1) What is the
status of the NECHR, which is a treaty, in the national legal orders of the Member States? (2) Is the NECHR a provision of national law as understood by the Court, and if not, may the national courts set aside a treaty?
The answer to these questions depends on the differing constitutional systems of the ten Member States. For example, the validity of rejecting the NECHR will depend on the rank of treaties
relative to statutes in the hierarchy of norms. In addition, the
Court's position in Simmenthal on which norms may be set aside
is unclear: "[A] national court which is called upon ...

to apply

provisions of Community law is under a duty to give full effect to
those provisions if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply
any conflicting provision of national legislation, even if adopted
subsequently .... "' The Court's ruling may be interpreted to
compel national courts to set aside any legal norm (law), or alternatively, only norms at the statute level (legislation). The French
and German versions of the decision do not clarify the Court's
decision. In the French version, the Court states that the judge
should "laisser inapplique . . . toute disposition contraire de la
loi nationale,"6 5 and "laisser inapplique ...
toute disposition

contraire de la legislation nationale."6 6
The French term loi refers to statutes enacted by the Parliament. The meaning of "legislation," however, can refer to general
legal norms including treaties. The German version, both in the
course of the decision and in the ruling, provides that the judge
should set aside "[J]ede m6glicherweise entgegenstehende
Bestimmung des nationalen Rechts.' 67 The German term Recht

refers to any legal norm. Thus, the examination of the decision's
63. Id., Point 21, at 644.
64. Id. at 645.
65. Id. at 644.
66. Id. at 645 (emphasis added).

67. Id. at 644-45 (emphasis added).
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different versions leaves the scope of the Court's decision unclear.
Even if Simmenthal mandates the rejection of any legal norm,
a national court may lack the power to reject treaties. For example, a French court would not be allowed to set aside a treaty
which, by its nature, is within the province of the executive
branch. A French court, in fact, must refer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when the interpretation of a treaty68 is at stake. This
procedure shows that the executive branch retains wide powers
over the treaties in force. In addition, the setting aside of a treaty
by a court would encroach on the function of the executive
branch to repeal treaties.
If the Court's decision endorses the setting aside of national
norms only at the statute level, the Member States would be divided between those countries that treat the NECHR as a statute
and those that rank the NECHR above statutes in the hierarchy
of norms. In some Member States,"9 therefore, a judge may set
aside the NECHR, but in other Member States7° the judge would
lack this power. 7 ' In the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark,
the judge would not have to set aside the NECHR, even if it materially conflicted with national norms, because the NECHR cannot be invoked by individuals in these countries.
The different rankings of the NECHR, together with the setting aside of statutory norms, would cause a double standard to
exist for the Member States. Some countries would be required to
set aside their NECHR in favor of the CECHR, but other countries would not have this requirement. The application of this
double standard to EC law would contradict another major principle of the EC legal order, uniformity.
If a national act implementing EC law contravenes the NECHR
but not the CECHR, a compromise may be reached even though
the CECHR theoretically binds the judge. The NECHR would be
more protective than the CECHR in this case. One can admit,
however, that the national court's setting aside of the NECHR
68. This applies except for Community treaties.

69. These countries include Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg (probably).
70. Among the second group are Belgium (probably), Greece (probably),

France, and The Netherlands.
71. See Golsong, Effet direct et range de la Convention Europ~enne des
Droits de l'Homme en droit interne, 1978 LEs RECOURS DES INDIVIDUS DEVANT LES
INSTANCES NATIONALES EN CAS DE VIOLATION DU DRorr EUROP4EN 59; see also

Drzemczewski, The Domestic Status of the European Convention on Human
Rights: New Dimensions, 1977-1 L.I.E.I. 1.
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would be useless because the purpose of the accession is to increase, not decrease, the protection granted to the citizens of the
EC. In addition, the supremacy of the CECHR is not violated by
enforcing a higher standard because the CECHR remains
respected. The two instruments are not in conflict but, in fact, are
complementary.
d. Counter proposition
A possible solution to the conflict arising when the CECHR is
more protective than the NECHR is to require EC adherence to
the Convention on the basis of a minimum standard: the EC
would be bound only by the provisions of the Convention, including the protocols, which bind the ten Member States. The conflict
described above, 2 therefore, would be avoided. The Commission,
however, has rejected this possibility in its memorandum.73 The
"minimum standard adhesion" also would fail to answer the reproaches of the German constitutional court7 4 because the EC
standard of protection would remain below that of a Member
State with a standard above the least protection granted by any
other Member State.
B. International Problems
The accession of the EC to the Convention presents two kinds
of international problems. The first is related to the EC's position
in the organs of Strasbourg and to the powers the treaty of adhesion would provide to the EC in these international bodies. The
second type of problem concerns the negotiation and the ratification of the Convention.
1. The Organs of Strasbourg
Of the three organs instituted by the Convention, the Commission and the Court are basically judicial and the Committee of
Ministers is a political organ.

72. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
73. Accession of the Communities, supra note 4, Point 29, at 16.
74. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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a. The Commission and the Court
The Commission of Human Rights and the Court of Human
Rights are bodies in which the members act in their own capacities, without receiving any recommendations from their government.h The contracting parties to the Convention which are not
members of the EC, therefore, should not fear an attempt by the
representatives of the EC countries to use their number to block
any action against the Community.
The Commission of the EC wishes to alter the present composition of the Commission of Human Rights and the Court of
Human Rights by adding a commissioner and a judge to these
bodies for the protection of the EC's international personality.78
On the other hand, Professor Schermers favors the current composition of the Commission of Human Rights and the Court of
Human Rights." He points out that the judges in the Court are
equal in number to the members of the Council of Europe but not
to the parties to the Convention. No link exists between the number of judges and the number of parties to the Convention. The
adding of a judge of the EC, therefore, is unnecessary because the
EC legal system would be represented by the ten judges of the
Member States. Professor Schermers suggests that a European
commissioner should not be appointed to the Commission because the Convention provides that no two members may be nationals of the same Member State. To allow the appointment of
an additional commissioner or judge, the Commission of the EC
would "require a derogation from articles 20 and 38" of the
Convention. 8
b. The Committee of Ministers
The Commission of the EC advocates a total exclusion of the
Committee from EC matters because the other contracting parties may fear that the Member States and the EC representatives
could veto decisions questioning EC acts.79 Although this problem
75.

Accession of the Communities, supra note 4, Point 31, at 17.

76. Id., Points 32-33.
77. Schermers, The Communities under the European Convention on
Human Rights, 1978-1 L.I.E.I. 1, 6.
78. Accession of the Communities, supra note 4, Point 33, at 18. Articles 20
and 38 of the Convention set forth the requirements for citizenship of judges

and commissioners.
79. Id., Point 34, at 18.
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could be overcome by having the Member State withdraw from
the Committee when EC matters come under scrutiny, the Commission asserts that this solution would reduce abnormally the
participation of the Member States and establish a dangerous
precedent for the exercise of mixed powers within international
organizations."0 When EC matters are challenged, therefore, the
Committee should be excluded and compulsory jurisdiction given
to the Court of Human Rights. Professor Schermers favors EC
representation in cases concerning its interests, but not in other
cases: "[T]he most suitable representation would then be that of
the Member State charged with the presidency of the Council [of
the EC], the other Member States not participating in the voting."' He concludes that a solution to the problem of EC representation is 2to bring all cases against the EC before the Court of
8

Strasbourg.

The question to resolve, however, is which cases are to be
brought against the EC. Assume that to apply an EC directive, a
Member State passes an act subsequently challenged by an individual claiming the norm is void because the directive violates the
CECHR. The national court will refer the case to the Court of
Luxembourg to have the validity of the EC directive scrutinized
under the CECHR. If the Court of Justice rules that the directive
is valid even though it violates the CECHR as interpreted by the
Court of Strasbourg, and if the national court applies that ruling,
then both the EC and the Member State will share responsibility
for violating the Convention. In this case, because it would be difficult to divide the responsibility between the EC and the Member State, both probably would share responsibility for the
violation. 83
2.

The Procedure of Accession

The legal basis for the accession of the EC to the ECHR is Article 235 of the EEC treaty.8 4 This provision can be used in the
80. Id.

81. Schermers, supra note 77, at 6. This view faces criticism already expressed by the Commission of the EC.

82. Id. at 7. He recognizes, however, that some cases would be unsuitable for
a Court decision because of their political nature. Id.
83. Id. at 8.
84. Other legal bases are Article 203 of the EAAC Treaty and Article 95 of
the ECSC Treaty. Accession of the Communities, supra note 4, Point 27, at 15.
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field of external relations to expand EC powers for the achievement of an EC objective. 5
The accession will require a modification of some ECHR provisions and the EEC Treaty. Article 219 of the EEC treaty, which
should be amended, provides that "[M]ember States undertake
not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this treaty to any method of settlement other than those
provided for therein."8 This provision in the EEC treaty would
prevent the Member State from suing the EC before the Court of
Strasbourg. Such a limitation contradicts the ECHR which allows
a contracting party to sue any other contracting party before the
organs of Strasbourg. 87 In addition, the limitation contained in
Article 219 would make the accession a mere formal acti if the
citizens of the EC are denied, at least for a transitional period,
the right of petition in Article 25 of the ECHR.8 Consequently,
Article 219 should be amended within the procedure outlined by
Article 236 of the EEC treaty. 9
The accession also will require many of the ECHR provisions to
be amended. According to the Commission, the ECHR provisions
using the term "state" are not applicable to international organizations. This problem, however, could be solved by "laying down
in an accession protocol that the Convention, when it uses terms
relating specifically to states, also applies mutatis mutandis to
the EC."90 Although this proposition provides a simple and reasonable solution to the problem, it may encounter some opposition from anti-Europeans who view the embodiment of such a
statement in an international instrument as tantamount to recognizing the EC as a state.
Article 66 of the ECHR, which provides that the Convention is
open only to members of the Council of Europe, should not prove
to be an obstacle to accession. The Commission argues that the
ECHR is not a legal act of the Council of Europe, but an independent mechanism.9 1 The EC's lack of membership in the Council
85. Id., Point 44, at 20.
86. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 219.
87. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 24, 213

U.N.T.S. 221, 236.
88. Accession of the Communities, supra note 4, Point 27, at 15.
89. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 236.
90. Accession of the Communities, supra note 4, Point 20, at 13 (italics
added).
91. Id., Point 35, at 18.
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of Europe would not be a major obstacle because the Convention
may be amended by the protocol of accession, one clause of which
would be the amendment of ECHR Article 66.92
The right to petition in ECHR Article 25, which France and
Greece had not accepted at the time of the Commission's memorandum, will be another point of debate. The change of the
French administration following the 1981 presidential election resulted in the acceptance of Article 25's right to petition. Greece
remains the only state in the EC denying its citizens the right to
petition. If Greece's position of "legal solitude" in the EC does
not lead the country to accept Article 25, the Commission proposes that the right to petition be set aside for a transitional
period.9"
IV.

CONCLUSION

Considering the numerous problems created by the accession,
including the length of time required and the administrative burdens placed on the EC, one may question the value of this project. The creation of a catalogue of rights, however, will require as
much time as the accession. As Professor Schermers points out,
producing such a catalogue specifically for the EC will further
split Western Europe, isolate the other members of the Council of
Europe, and limit the effectiveness of the ECHR to the extent
that the provisions in the catalogue would offer higher standards
of protection.94 One may argue, however, that the benefit of a
more integrated EC outweighs the cost of a less influential ECHR
in the field of international protection of human rights. The
Member States of the EC will remain bound by the ECHR and,
therefore, this instrument will retain its valued status as one of
the most advanced conventions in the field.
Even though the ECHR is advantageous because it is currently
in existence, the arguments of the Commission in its favor are not
compelling. The Commission rejects the idea of drawing up an EC
catalogue of human rights in the near future because "the
chances of agreeing within a reasonable period of time, on [such]
a catalogue ... remain slight. '95 The Commission does recognize
in its conclusion, however, that "the negotiations concerning ac92.
93.
94.
95.

Schermers, supra note 77, at 4.
Accession of the Communities, supra note 4, Point 27, at 16.
Schermers, supra note 77, at 2.
Accession of the Communities, supra note 4, Point 17, at 12.
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cession by the Community to the Convention will certainly take
several years." 96 In addition, the ratification by each contracting
state to the ECHR is required for EC adherence to the Convention. This ratification requirement implies, paradoxically, that the
Commission trusts Malta or Iceland more than the Member
States to advance the protection of fundamental rights within the
EC.
One of the risks that the Member States incur in choosing either accession or an EC catalogue is the possibility that the new
EC instrument will supersede their own norms and, thus, repeat
the United States experience in which the Bill of Rights, originally intended to apply only to the federal government, now applies to all state governments.9 It may be argued, however, that
the Court of Justice of Luxembourg is already in the process of
solving this problem of fundamental rights. In the Hauer case, 8
the Court stated that to answer the question of infringement
upon the right of property, "it is necessary to consider also the
indications provided by the constitutional rules and practices of
the nine Member States."9 9 The Court referred only to the German, Italian, and Irish Constitutions when it considered the limitations on the right of property.1 0 0 The Court may have looked to
the German and Italian Constitutions to show that the Hauer
holding did not violate the constitutions of the Member States
whose constitutional courts had raised some questions about fundamental rights protection. The Court's reliance on three of the
ten Member States' constitutions may prove to be a mechanism
for adopting an optimum standard of protection. Using this
mechanism to construct an optimum standard, relevant provisions found in only a few constitutions could be selectively chosen, and other constitutions not providing the right in question
could be ignored. The Court's approach in finding common constitutional principles is sufficiently vague to permit the Court to
choose select constitutional principles. When discussing the
"practices" of the Member States, the Court speaks of "numerous
legislative measures" limiting the right of property, but never
identifies these pieces of legislation. The Court stated in the Nold

96.

Id., Point 46, at 21.

97. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

98. 1979 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 3727.
99. Id..
100. Id.
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case 01 that it had to "draw inspiration" from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States to identify those "measures which are incompatible with the fundamental rights recognized and protected by the Constitutions of such states" 10 2 and
unacceptable to the Court. This is an objective approach: the
rights must be recognized and, therefore, expressly stated by the
constitutions. The Court's use of the vague term "drawing inspiration" in Nold also allows the selective choosing of constitutional
principles. In the Hauer case, the Court spoke only of the "ideas"
and "precepts" common to the constitutions of the Member
States. Nothing is more ethereal or subjective than an idea or a
precept as opposed to a "right recognized by a constitution." The
Court, rather than adopting common constitutional principles
and practices and therefore embracing the lowest level of protection, will be able to adopt a higher standard of protection by stating that a right is a "precept" common to the ten constitutions of
the Member States.
This process of protecting fundamental rights through Court
decisions is slow and uncertain. The process of accession, however, would require a greater length of time and would give rise to
the many conflicts discussed above.10 3 Allowing the Court of Justice decisions to implement protections, therefore, could provide a
workable solution to the problem of individual fundamental
rights and extinguish the need for accession to the ECHR.

101.

1974 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 491.

102. Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
103. See supra note 86-97 and accompanying text.

